Recently, several regulatory initiatives have been taken by the Council of Europe, OECD and national legislators to regulate diff erent aspects of human genetics. However, the latest research fi ndings and the emergence of systems biology call this approach into question as they constitute a substantial change in natural science and philosophy. Th is article argues that law should take this paradigm shift into consideration and that it is not possible to perceive genetic data as exceptional and suitable for special protection. Instead, norms should be designed around notions such as 'biological' and 'predictive' data.
Introduction
Th e legal status of DNA and genetic information has been extensively analysed in legal literature. Th e rise and fall of hopes regarding the Human Genome Project (HGP) that was well refl ected in the debate on genetic exceptionalism appears to have been adequately anticipated in jurisprudence. However to date, the conceptual diffi culties regarding the legal protection of health data obtainable as a result of the advances in biosciences seem not to have been resolved. Confusion remains as to the actual object of legislation. Th is confusion is likely to grow in the light of the recent developments of the so-called postgenomic era, 'in which genetic information will have to be examined in multiple health care situations throughout the lives of individuals' 2 and the emergence of systems biology, which views organisms as integrated and interacting networks of genes, proteins and biochemical reactions which give rise to life. 3 Regardless of how long we may have to wait for systems biology to become an every day element of medical practice, it is not too early to give some thought to future developments in data protection law particularly in relation to the recent changes in the fi eld of genetics, genomics, biology and biomedicine. Public debate still seems to feature the semantics and rhetoric employed at the beginning of the HGP. Policies and laws are being built around the basic notions of geneticsgenetic information and DNA. Despite the criticism of the concept of genetic exceptionalism, we are currently witnessing the adoption of acts dealing specifically with genetic information and testing; including the Council of Europe Additional Protocol to Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, the OECD Draft Guidelines for Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases, the UK's Equality Act and the US Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) -the latter two imposing a ban on genetic discrimination.
Th e question that needs to be answered is whether in the light of the recent advances in biology and medicine, this approach is still justifi ed. Is it still possible to perceive genetic data as distinct from other medical data (if only in some instances) and, thus, suitable for a special regulatory regime? To what extent is it justifi ed to propose a reconceptualisation of existing laws and the creation of new types of rights protecting the individual? Finally, since medical science and ethics do not conform to national boundaries, the problem of whether and to what extent further harmonisation between domestic legislation is needed remains crucial. Do solutions adopted by national legislators allow and facilitate such harmonisation? In other words, is there a common vision within Europe regarding how the challenges posed by new biosciences should be addressed?
In order to answer all the above questions, it is necessary to compare binding and non-binding legal instruments adopted at the national and supranational level. Th e comparison is based on the premise that although legal systems in Europe are based on common values, they stem from very diff erent legal traditions. Th e most representative example of the common law system is Great Britain, whilst Germany presents a sound example of continental law system. Poland constitutes a separate category because of its experiences of the socialist legal system and the subsequent transformation phase. Th e underlying assumption of this comparison is that if the normative solutions adopted in such diverse legal systems are similar, then there is a chance for harmonisation at the supranational level.
Th e Changing Role of Genetic Information in the Discourse Surrounding Bioscience
Genetic information may be described as a set of biological instructions required to arrange the process of inheritance. After the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA it has been announced a vital determinant of our existence. In the early days it became common to think of a gene as a stretch of DNA that directed the production of, or "coded for", a protein. ' 4 An organism's genes were thus said to provide a plan or a blueprint for the whole organism. Th is hierarchical explanation lead scientists to attempt to use and control genetic information in a way that would broaden the ability to predict and directly infl uence our future health, and determine the characteristics of our off spring. Th e advances in genetics, genomics and reproductive medicine are thus often seen as having already shifted the line between chance and choice, 5 thus, enhancing individual autonomy. It was hoped that the Human Genome Project launched and conducted in the in the 1990s would reveal 'the secret of life' 6 and answer crucial questions about human nature.
Th is view is closely interrelated to the concepts of genetic reductionism, essentialism and determinism. Reductionism is an approach 'rooted in an assumption that complex problems are solvable by dividing them intro smaller, simpler, and thus more tractable units.' 7 Because reductionism often disregards the dynamic interactions between parts, the system is depicted as a collection of static components. In the medical context it implies the view that human body is a collection of components, which typically leads physicians to treat disease by identifying the isolatable abnormality as a single factor most responsible for the observed symptoms. In practice it refl ects the common, uni-dimensional, "one-risk-factor to one-disease" approach. 8 Genetic essentialism is dependent upon the belieffundamental to western culture -that understanding can be gained by reducing an object of knowledge to its 'essence'. 9 According to genetic essentialism this essence is to be found in genes. In turn, determinism as a general philosophical (epistemological) concept implies a world 'in which everything that happens is fully necessitated by antecedent circumstances'. 10 Genetic determinism is usually thought of as the belief that all physical and behavioural phenotypes are determined mostly or exclusively by the genes. Th e term may be applied to the mapping of a single gene to a single phenotype or to the belief that most or all phenotypes are determined mostly or exclusively by genes.
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Th e research conducted within and inspired by the Human Genome Project soon called into question the basic presumptions of genetics. High predictive capacity of information derived from DNA analysis and the mapping of human genome appeared to be true only to a very limited extent, for X-linked and single gene disorders. Apart from disorders such as Huntington's disease, Th alassaemia, Sickle cell anemia, Cystic Fibrosis, Tay Sachs disease and Fragile X syndrome, 12 most diseases have a very complex aetiology. Given that individuals diff er from one another by approximately 6 million DNA polymorphisms, and the environmental signals to which each of us is exposed also vary greatly it fi nally became obvious that, in order to predict a disease, personalised approach is necessary. However, even fi elds such as genomics, proteomics 13 and metabolomics, 14 which developed as results of the HGP, failed to provide answers.
Th ere are circumstances in which the complex interplay between parts yields a behaviour that cannot be predicted by the investigation of the parts alone. (. . .) Th e human genome contains 30,000 to 35,000 genes which encode for nearly 100 trillion cells in human body. Th e richness of information is derived not only in the genes themselves but also in the interaction between genes and between their respective products. (. . .) Between each hierarchical level, modifi cations (. . .) are made, and at each hierarchical level, thousands of molecules interact with other molecules to create complex regulatory network. What becomes evident from these molecular analyses is that phenotypic traits emerge from the collective action of multiple individual molecules. Th erefore, the previous notion that a single genetic mutation is responsible from most phenotypic defects is overly simplistic. Complex disease such as cancer, asthma, or atherosclerosis cannot generally be explained by a single gene mutation.
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It is often pointed out that human genome project was one of the major impetuses for the creation of systems biology, which was conceived to address the molecular complexities seen in biological systems. 16 However, it was not the only one. Th e development of systems biology would not be possible without the parallel emergence of cross-disciplinary biology, the internet and the idea that biology is an informational science. All these circumstances allowed system science to focus on the interactions and dynamics between individual components, taking into consideration new factors, i.e. context, time and space. 17 Th e potential seen in this approach leads inevitably to the idea of systems medicine. Th e latter would involve the analysis of multiple parameters obtained across multiple time points and spatial conditions to achieve holistic perspective of an individual. Hence, today it is not genetic or genomics as such, but systems medicine that is hoped to enable individualised treatments, minimised interventions, and multidimensional uses of medications, as well as time-and spacesensitive treatments and probabilistic forecasting. 18 Th is major shift in perception of the role of DNA in the process of ontogeny had a great impact on the understanding and evaluation of genetic information. It has been well captured in the following words:
Th ere is a technical meaning of "information" in which it means only that the state of one thing (the bearer of information) provides more or less reliable predictions about the state of another (that about which it gives information). But if this is all that is meant by talk of genetic information, one could equally well speak of the information carried by a great many structural and chemical features of the cell, and even feature of the environment in which this organism develops. (. . .) Genes, on this view, are simply one -no doubt a very interesting one -of the resources that the organism requires for its proper development. (. . .) As just noted, the information required to build an organism is distributed over many levels of biological and external organization. 19 Th is quote marks a major paradigm shift that has recently taken place in natural sciences and philosophy. Th is change cannot pass unnoticed in the legal arena. Although today the threat of 'genetization' 20 may seem a bit out of date, because genetics has not delivered the expected answers, the vision of a 'medicalised' 21 society is still appealing. Th is is so, especially in the light of promises given by systems biologists. It may even mean reinforcement of the competing interests and rights arising between diff erent legal entities and actors with regard to the potential benefi ts in the exploitation of biological/genetic information. Similar diffi culties arise from the fact that the long-term social, economic and legal consequences of these developments remain uncertain or unknown. It will be interesting to see whether the law regarding the use of genetic information is appropriate to answer tomorrow's questions and, also, what the optimal trajectory of its future development should be.
Problems with Defi nition and Subsumption

Defi nition
Creating a legal defi nition is never an easy task. It must be precise enough to prevent misinterpretations in practice but fl exible enough to enable further negotiations of the meaning and adjustments to the changing social circumstances. Consequently, too narrow a defi nition of genetic data may result in reducing the protection of the individual. Too broad a defi nition may either impede scientifi c research and the distribution of benefi ts across society or have an opposite eff ect of confusion and ambiguity. Interestingly, although there is no legally binding defi nition of genetic data in the medical context either at the national or at the international level, a proliferation of diff erent attempts appear in the area of soft law. Th e defi nitions contained in guidelines produced by professional and advisory bodies and international organisations are very inclusive and refl ect a broad understanding of genetic data. 22 First, although some legal scholars perceive the notions of 'information' and 'data' as distinctive, 23 the latter is treated as tantamount to the former. Th is presumption may be considered slightly simplistic in the light of the complexity of genetic knowledge. However, it follows strictly decisions made years ago in the fi eld of data protection law. Secondly, the document does not explain what 'scientifi c analysis' means nor whether it also encompasses scientifi c methods of deriving information about hereditable characteristics of a person in the course of studying family history. Th irdly, the Declaration also applies to proteomic data 'pertaining to an individual's proteins including their expression, modifi cation and interaction' and to 'biological samples (for example blood, skin and bone cells or blood plasma) in which nucleic acids are present and which contain the characteristic genetic make-up of an individual'. 24 In other words, genetic material is subsumed under the notion of data, and treated as such. Consequently, following the currently predominant trend, the Declaration uses the term 'database' to denote physical samples as well as the information derived from them. 25 Th is approach seems to stem from the view that genetic material is substantially diff erent from other data storage media, for it is inextricably linked to genetic information encoded therein. To put it simply, unlike in the case of data saved on a fl oppy disk, you cannot erase genetic information without destroying the material in which it is stored (there is no such thing as an 'empty' biological sample). It follows that a defi nite destruction of the information requires a destruction of the DNA sample. Th is fact is seen by some scholars as suffi cient to subsume biological material containing DNA under data protection law.
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Th at argument, however, seems to miss an important point insofar as there appears to be no consideration of the fact that genetic analysis to reveal the meaning of genetic information is a very lengthy and complicated process, requiring extremely specialized knowledge and technical equipment. Furthermore, even where the genetic code is transcribed into data related to health or individual characteristics, those data can only be interpreted by experts in genetics and medicine. Biological samples could thus be seen as a data only with regard to their potentiality, since information/data are defi ned as knowledge received by communication. Th erefore, such a general subsumption seems incorrect as long as genetic material is collected and stored without the possibility of biochemical analysis. 27 It follows that the data protection regime would be activated as soon as such an analysis is successfully completed. 28 In other words, this line of argument does not question the mere fact of the applicability of data protection law to genetic material, but is meant to highlight the moment in time from which this regime should be applied. Such a distinction may help avoid competing rules concerning body parts with those designed to protect data. Th ere is a diff erent rationale behind each of them, but they overlap in certain contexts such as in 'biobanks'.
A similarly broad defi nition of 'genetic information' was adopted by the UK Human Genetics Commission (HGC). According to its reports 'personal genetic information is any information about the genetic make-up of an identifi able person, whether it comes from DNA testing or from any other source (including the 33 Most of these proposals set rules regarding all kinds of post-natal genetic testing in the context of medical treatment, insurance and employment.
Context-based Approach
In this respect the approach adopted by the Council of Europe in the Recommendation on the protection of medical data 97(5) seems more appropriate since it regulates the use of genetic data in the medical context and treats such data as a category of medical data. Such a regulatory solution seems to correspond much better with the systems medicine approach, which treats genetic information only as one factor in the dynamically developing system. Moreover, the document focuses only on the informational aspect of DNA, which seems to make the enforceability of its provisions much easier. Art. 1 of the document stipulates that:
Th e expression "genetic data" refers to all data of whatever type, concerning the hereditary characteristics of an individual or concerning the pattern of inheritance of such characteristics within a related group of individuals. It also refers to all data on the carrying of any genetic information (genes) in an individual or genetic line relating to any aspect of health or disease, whether present as identifi able characteristics or not. 34 Th e Recommendation thus emphasises the meta-individual and inter-generational nature of genetic information -features that seem to underlie the most 29 acute legal conundrums. On the other hand, however, the defi nition is extremely broad and it includes data of a hereditary nature, independently of the source and method of their acquisition. According to the Explanatory Memorandum 35 the defi nition of genetic data does not include the results of an analysis carried out by other means than DNA technology on blood, tissue, hair, sperm, and so forth. Such material might, however, produce genetic data when analysed (para. 41). At the same time, however, 'genetic information may result from phenotypic observations, family history studies and laboratory analyses, including observation of genes closely linked to genes causing disease or observation of such genes themselves by DNA technology" (para. 42)'.
36 Th e adoption of such a broad defi nition results in a uniform set of rules applying to data concerning particular genes (single gene mutations, polygenic conditions regardless of penetrance), 37 genomes (total DNA carried by a cell or an organism in its chromosomes), genotypes (entire genetic constitution of an individual cell or organism), 38 parts of the genome constituting the so called 'genetic fi ngerprints' or even phenotypic data of a hereditary nature (skin or eye colour).
In fact, under this defi nition most of the data concerning our biological constitution are genetic. What is more, the Recommendation R (97)5 views genetic data as a homogenous category. However, one has to remember that this is not in fact the case and that genetic data may vary substantially in their level of predictability, susceptibility or even their potential for identifi cation purposes, which depends on the level of relatedness to the person. Th e most apparent differences appear among monogenic and polygenic or multi-factorial diseases. Th ese diff erences underlie the classifi cation of genetic tests into diagnostic, predictive/presymptomatic, carrier and susceptibility tests. Th is variability of actual information communicated to the individual seems to underlie the fact that the recent Additional Protocol on Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, approved by the Committee of Ministers on the 2 May 2008 refers to the use of genetic tests (rather than data), defi ning the former as the analysis of DNA, RNA chromosomes or any other biological material which enables such information to be obtained. Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases (HBGRD), recently made available for public consultation. On the one hand, the document is still framed around the word 'genetic' when it speaks of 'genetic research databases' and 'genetic data held in them'. 40 On the other hand, it repeatedly uses the term 'human biological materials and data', which shows that its drafters took into account the new developments in biosciences, the variety of data collected in the so-called HBGRD, and the impossibility to clearly classify them. Although the term 'genetic data' has not been defi ned, its systematic interpretation implies that it is restricted only to the person's genetic code (although more precisely -genome), stored as a sequence of letters, which helps the identifi cation of the individual. Th is interpretation can be supported by the view that 'biological information is of two distinct types -the digital information of the genome and the environmental cues that come outside the genome -together they are responsible for the development of the organism as well as their physiological responses.'
41 Such a solution should be viewed positively as long as the distinction made between genetic and other biological data remains descriptive and does not ascribe any normative value to the former.
Th e diffi culties in defi ning genetic information as a subject of regulation seem to have resulted in the lack of a legally binding defi nition in the area of hard law. Th is, in itself, is not unusual. To postpone making a defi nition allows to avoid the risk of ascribing signifi cance and value to the defi ned object to be avoided. Simple answers are not generally helpful. More pragmatically, decisions about what needs to be done may be made without defi ning the issue at stake. Some bioethicists urge that defi nitions are inadvisable, and that it is necessary to regulate without defi ning. 42 It may well be said, that it is not so much how we describe an object, but rather what rights we ascribe to it. Consequently, it is the legal regime regulating the use of genetic data that plays a decisive role in the protection of the individual.
Subsumption
According to EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data ' "personal data" refers to any information relating to an identifi ed or identifi able natural person ("data subject"); an identifi able person is one who can be identifi ed, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifi cation number or to one or more factors specifi c to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 43 Moreover, in order to determine whether a person is identifi able, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify that person. 44 According to D. Beyleveld in the light of such wording, genetic data are not essentially personal data. Data is personal if it is collected from an identifi able person, or becomes such if it is processed in such a way that it can be linked (by means reasonably likely to be used) to an identifi able person. He goes on to argue that 'in most contexts -especially where genetic data is being used for medical research -genetic data (and even genetic material) must be considered to be personal data, at least at the time when it is obtained.' 45 Th is argument seems, however, superfl uous, since one could question whether the same could not be said with regard to all medical and other categories of data. An X-ray photograph found on the street of a person's teeth would not count as personal data unless linked with other information. Consequently, in the medical context genetic data are to be subsumed under the notion of personal data.
Another issue is that not all genetic data are medical data, since information derived from the non-coding parts of the DNA, often used as genetic fi ngerprints cannot usually give any direct insight to person's present or future health. 46 Th is has been acknowledged by the drafters of the Recommendation R (97)5 on the protection of medical data. In the Explanatory Report they argue that 'genetic data are medical data only if they are relevant to health or disease in an individual or his/her relatives' (para. 43). 47 However, medical data apply equally to past, present and future health (para. 37). Hence, in the medical context genetic data will also be regarded as medical data. Th is interpretation also applies at the level of legally binding norms, despite the fact that there exists no defi nition of medical data exists either. Th is is important since medical data fall under the concept of sensitive data, which deserve a higher level of protection. Yet, it also means that genomic data which does not concern health, and data revealing 'genetic fi ngerprints' will not be seen as sensitive data under the Directive 95/46/EC.
Th is problem has been addressed in the Polish Data Protection Act 1996, although the eff ect remains ambivalent. Article 27 of the Polish DPA 1996 imposes a ban on processing data which contains information about a person's health or genetic code and divides them into two distinct categories. Following the general rationale of data protection law (including Directive 95/46/EC), ' However, the defi nition has been worded in such a way that covers also genetic data which are not considered to be medical data in the recommendation' in: Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation (97)5 on the protection of medical data, Supra note 36, para. 44. which aims to weigh up individual and community interests, the Polish Act allows for certain exceptions to this rule.
Consequently, health and genetic data may be processed if: a) the person whom these data concern gives her written consent or b) the processing takes place 'for the purpose of the protection of health, the provision of care or treatment of patients by health professionals or the management of health care services.'
48 Th e distinction made between medical and genetic data was clearly designed to protect genetic data outside the medical context. However, as a result of such wording written, consent becomes a requirement when processing data concerning genetic code. Data concerning genetic code will obviously have to include also data about such characteristics as eye and skin colour or sex. Such data are visible and, therefore, usually treated as obvious, but may become sensitive in certain contexts. It is thus not clear in which circumstances written consent is required. In light of the forthcoming use of biometric data in identity cards, this requirement could aff ect the operationability of the future law.
Th e above example illustrates that lack of defi nition in certain instances may cause problems. At the same time, the Polish solution seems to rest upon the idea that genetic data are distinctively diff erent from other categories of data -even medical data -and, therefore, require special protection. Th is highly controversial concept, known as genetic exceptionalism, was strongly supported at the time the Human Genome Project was launched, but became contested due to ambiguous and inconclusive fi ndings of further genetic research. Nevertheless, the debate is of crucial importance to the development of a regulatory regime governing the use of genetic data and genetic material. Although it is well known, the main arguments used in the debate are worth mentioning to clarify the later reasoning.
Th e Debate on Genetic Exceptionalism
Arguments in Favour of Genetic Exceptionalism
Th e idea of genetic exceptionalism is closely related to the concepts of genetic essentialism and determinism, which treat genetic information as the essential determinant of human existence. Th e proponents of genetic exceptionalism perceive genetic data as distinctive and particularly sensitive. Th is view seems to be supported by two inherent features of genetic information -its sameness and uniqueness. On the one hand our genome is species-wide and intergenerational. On the other, data derived from DNA analysis refer to the genetic make-up of an individual and enable his/her unique identifi cation. As a result of these two characteristics it is argued that in comparison with other medical indicators, genetic data off er a much higher degree of specifi city in determining future health. Genetics coupled with reproductive medicine has allowed parents to determine some features of their off spring, like sex or deafness. Th ese advances are said to shift the line between chance and choice, 50 hence, enhancing individual autonomy and even shaping future generations. Transposing this debate into law, many scholars 51 used to argue similarly to L.O. Gostin, that: there are "compelling justifi cations" for special privacy protection for genetic information, grounded in the sheer breadth of information discoverable [from an extremely small sample]; the potential to unlock secrets that are currently unknown about the person; (. . .) the stability of DNA rendering distant future applications possible; and the generalizability of the data to families, genetically related communities, and ethnic and racial populations. 52 Over the course of time, along with the HGP, genetic exceptionalism gained support at the international level, resulting in a series of initiatives by various human rights organizations. Th e most prominent example is the UNESCO Declaration (2003), in which Article 4 explicitly acknowledges the special status of genetic data. In addition to the above arguments it underlines the cultural signifi cance that such data may have for persons or groups. 53 It concludes that consequently, due consideration should be given to the sensitivity of human genetic data and an appropriate level of protection for these data and biological samples should be established. 54 A similar, although more context-oriented regulatory direction was taken in the Council's of Europe Recommendation (97)5 on Medical Data and the Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on Genetic Testing for Health Purposes.
55 Th e Recommendation contains a restrictive defi nition of genetic analysis. However, although both acts limit their scope to medical practice, they acknowledge some particularities of use of information derived from human biological samples. Th ey are both based on the idea that processing of unique genetic data in an information society poses the risk of discrimination, stigmatisation, social exclusion and violation of human rights. Th ey focus on the problems that might occur on the individual level. Th ey also constitute a special set of rules concerning competing rights over such data of diff erent individuals, in particular family members; and provide solutions for situations in which these rights come into confl ict. However, since recent research suggests that most diseases have a mixed and complex aetiology, the importance of this document may be signifi cantly limited.
Th e adoption of special rules off ering stronger protection at the national level with regard to individual genetic data concerning genetic information appears to be much more pluralistic. Th is has been supported by various professional and advisory bodies in the UK, in particular by the HGC, which issued several reports attempting to generate standards in the use of genetic information. 56 However, the draft legislation on genetic testing has not yet been adopted. Despite the legislative drive to ascribe special protection to genetic data, legally binding documents, including data protection acts in the UK and Germany do not refer to genetic data as a separate category. Legal documents favouring genetic exceptionalism adopted or proposed at the international and national level lack legally binding force.
Arguments Against Genetic Exceptionalism
Th ere are two plausible explanations as to why genetic exeptionalism is pursued only in soft law. First, it seems that there is still relatively little understanding of genetics and genomics and their long term consequences for society. Although law has produced mechanisms of risk assessment in the fi eld of environmental protection, no formula has yet been found to deal with uncertainties concerning the individual in a biomedical context (with the exception of the standardisation of pharmaceutical products and devices). Some even claim that 'it is futile to predict (. . .) how genetics and biotechnology will change the face of the National Health Service or the health of the population.' 57 We cannot know what the full eff ects will be because 'society becomes a laboratory (. . .). Experiments in biotechnology (. . .) become inconclusive in the dimension of time, space and the number of people involved.' 58 Consequently, law still struggles to fi nd an adequate approach towards a regulatory framework for managing rapidly changing life sciences, in particular genetics, genomics and now also systems biology.
Second, opponents of genetic exceptionalism, who may be called inclusivists point to the lack of clear criteria to diff erentiate between genetic and medical data. Th ey defend the view that the notion of genetic data is included in the broader term medical data and, therefore, their use should be governed by general rules of data protection law, which should be interpreted accordingly. Th ey also argue that:
Acceptance of genetic exceptionalism, would in practice require health systems to adopt a two bucket theory of disease, categorising and tossing every disease and risk factor into either the genetic or the non-genetic bucket -whereas many diseases and risks don't fi t neatly into either bucket. (. . .) Th e distinction between genetic and non-genetic factors is not the crucial one. 59 Much more important seems to be the distinction between lowly and highly predictive data about health, regardless of their genetic (e.g. Huntington's disease) or non-genetic origin (e.g. HIV). Vital to this criticism is the fact that genetic information is not a homogenous category of data, for its level of susceptibility (and gene penetrance) varies substantially from one condition to another. In addition, genetic exceptionalism may result in the reinforcement of genetic stigmatization and exclusion, 60 since the perception of genetics and genomics is burdened by misconceptions, many of which originate in the philosophical concepts of biological determinism and reductionism. 61 A stronger protection of genetic data in comparison to other health data could mean, for example, that a woman with a breast cancer of non-genetic origin will be treated diff erently from a woman suff ering from the same condition on genetic grounds. Finally, according to the anti-exceptionalists, known as contextualists, the sensitivity of any personal data depends not on the content, but rather the context in which information is used. Th is argument forms part of a broader criticism, present in German literature since the early 1990s, which tried to disregard the whole concept of sensitive data. To use an earlier example, a person's dental data of may become extremely sensitive in the hands of a professional who would use them for purposes of identifi cation. To sum up, such a contextualised approach seems more appropriate, plausible and feasible, for it takes into consideration the changing sensitivity of data in diff erent circumstances and hence, helps to avoid too strong or too low protection for the individual.
Practical Implications
Arguments against genetic exceptionalism have direct implications for the medical practice and research. Th ere are two main areas where these implications require serious consideration. First, there are the rules designed to tackle the most feared consequences of biotechnological developments: namely genetic discrimination and stigmatisation. Th e prevention of such consequences has become one of the most vital points on the bioethical and bio-legal agenda. Every eff ort should be made to ensure that human genetic data and human proteomic data are not used for purposes that discriminate (. . .) or lead to the stigmatization of an individual, a family, a group or communities. 65 Moratoria on the use of genetic testing and codes of practice have been accepted by insurers and employers for example in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Th e main aim of these measures was to prevent insurers and employers from discriminating on the grounds of future health conditions. However, since recent advances in genomic science have revealed a high complexity of biological processes of ontogeny, the problem of taxonomy occurred and the simple classifi cation of disease into genetic and non-genetic does not seem to apply anymore. Th is makes legal regulations treating genetic data as one homogenous category highly questionable. Since genes diff er substantially in terms of penetrance, and genetic tests thus diff er in terms of predictive power, the existing formulation of the ban of discrimination on the basis of genetic features faces serious problems in terms of enforceability. It is impossible to determine which information should be considered genetic. A broad interpretation of 'genetic' would encapsulate characteristics that are determined by an unknown mix of genetic and environmental factors. Because 'genetic data' includes information about sex, then race and ethnicity would be genetic too. Th is interpretation could undermine the validity of these traits as a basis for anti-discrimination law. On the other hand, limiting the scope of anti-discrimination principle to the genotypic ('hidden') data allows discrimination on the grounds of phenotypic data or family history.
Th erefore, what needs to be considered is a complex, multidimensional, context-based, anti-discriminatory framework of regulation. For consistency's sake, the ban on discrimination should encompass all predictive information about future as well as invisible health characteristics, regardless of whether they are of a genetic or non-genetic origin. Th e same applies to the ban on genetic testing. Th e existing moratoria are usually limited to DNA testing, which leaves aside information derived from family history. Th e latter may in fact be much more predictive than information obtained from a genetic test. Of course, a legitimate assumption could be made that family history is diff erent from genetic testing, because as something already known in the family does not bring the risk of violating the legis of 'the right not to know'. However, its validity and strength in the context of insurance is limited.
First of all, genetic tests are usually conducted to confi rm some information derived from family history. Besides, it would be extremely diffi cult to prove to what extent a person appreciates the importance of information derived from his/her family history, and to what extent a mere questionnaire form completed for insurance purposes could infringe this right. A prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of predictive health data still allows distinctions to be made between individuals on the basis of objective criteria, and provides a more stringent protection of the individual against illegitimate diff erentiation. Such an approach seems much more coherent than the existing one, which by denying access to a very limited amount of information, bypasses the debate on the changes in the insurance system. Th e rejection of genetic exceptionalism has further consequences in the context of DNA databases. Leaving aside the discussion about the harmonisation of the nomenclature used with regard to biobanks, 66 it should be remembered that in the health sector genetic databases sensu stricto play a very limited role. 9 . In these two papers the authors notice the variety of names and terms used to describe collections of human biological samples and data. However, they do neither discuss the ambivalence of the term 'biobank' as such.
main reason for establishing biobanks is the potential benefi t stemming from research involving not only genetic data, but also 'ordinary data', such as clinical data, and/or health data, and/or genealogical data, and/or life-style data, and/or environmental data. Requiring a special regulatory regime for genetic data 'would result in diff erent standards applying to diff erent types of data in the same collection' 67 and a subsequent proliferation of rules. Since it appears that the classifi cation of health data would encounter serious diffi culties, the introduction of special rules within one database is undesirable.
To sum up, the ambiguity and vagueness of the notion of genetic information, genetic data and genetic features raise questions about the idea of a special regulatory regime. For the same reasons, the theoretical framework of the so-called 'right to genetic-informational self-determination' (Rechts auf gen-informationelle Selbstbestimmung), proposed in German literature in order to encompass all specifi c rights designed to protect genetic data should be dismissed both at the descriptive and normative level of analysis. 68 Nevertheless, genetic exceptionalism has inspired other conceptual approaches for the protection of individual rights with regards to genetic data despite its pitfalls. At the same time, biotechnological progress coupled with rapid developments in information technology may transform medicine from characteristically therapeutic into diagnostic and preventative, 69 facilitating the improvement of public health. Th is raised heated public debates. Prima facie, the clash between the individual and society seems quite old and already thoroughly discussed in legal theory. However, sameness and uniqueness of genetic data add a new dimension to existing confl icts, reinforcing parties' claims. On the one hand, the state's title to limit personal autonomy gains a new justifi cation and principles such as solidarity and altruism become emphasised. 
Conclusion
It is very diffi cult to make any defi nite conclusions about a branch of law that is still in statu nascendi. It is also diffi cult to design the law in such a way that it can respond to the challenges posed by a fast moving area of research, such as bioscience. Th ese diffi culties were exemplifi ed by the rise and fall of the concept of genetic exceptionalism, which mirrored the initial enthusiasm and later disappointment associated with the Human Genome Project. Th at project revealed a complex interdependence and dynamic interactions between genetic information and environmental factors. Th us, laws based on genetic exceptionalism appeared 67 to provide an inadequate regulatory framework for the use of biological information. First, they wrongly ascribe too much importance to genetics. Second, they ignore the practical problems with distinguishing 'genetic' from other 'health' data and impose double standards of legal protection in the course of their processing.
Th ese reasons are most likely why binding instruments contain very few rules concerning genetic information or data. Th e Draft Protocol on Genetic Testing for Health Purposes will become one of the few examples of this. By contrast, the concept of genetic exceptionalism appears predominant in soft law documents, which, in addition, proliferate substantially. Among them there are two UNESCO Declarations on Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and Human Genetic Data (2003), Council of Europe recommendations (e.g. on the protection of medical data (97)5) and national guidelines issued by government and professional regulatory bodies. Moreover, several international initiatives (EuroGentest, Public Population Project on Genetics P3G) have been launched recently, aiming to facilitate the harmonisation of genetic practices across and beyond Europe. Both projects help to negotiate common standards and educate the public, yet they still operate within the 'genetic/genomic' paradigm. It remains to be seen what role they will play in the supranational regulatory processes. In this respect several suggestions seem legitimate.
First, the normative value of 'genetic data' should be reconsidered. Th is is not to say that the fi eld of genetic/genomic research and practice should remain unregulated. However, the term 'genetic information' could be replaced by the term 'biological information'. In this respect, the OECD Draft Guidelines on HBRGD that use in the term 'biological materials and data', constitute a step in the right direction. In the medical context, data protection law could continue to use the existing term 'health data'. Second, the legal framework should become context-sensitive. Th e branches of medical, employment, insurance, family and forensic law are governed by diff erent rationale and require diff erent solutions. Th ird, in the context of diagnostic and presymptomatic testing for disease, it seems more appropriate to design the legislation around the notion of 'predictive information/testing' rather then 'genetic information/testing'. Th e rules of conduct would be diff erentiated according to the levels of predictability of the information/test. Consequently, the superfi cial distinction between genetic and non-genetic diseases could be eliminated from the legislation. Th ese changes could provide more suitable frameworks for solving the confl icts of rights arising between the subjects interested in acquiring the information.
Finally, since the key to diagnostics in the future seems to be multiparameter analyses, computers and biological information (rather than biological materials) might become predominant in medical practice. Th is paradigm shift can be observed in the fact that the concept of informed consent became central to the existing legislation dealing with human body. Th is, however, is not suffi cient.
Instead, a much broader idea of informational autonomy that includes informed consent, the right to privacy, personal development and the protection of one's identity should be aff orded more attention. It provides the tools necessary to control the fl ow of data, but leaves a certain amount of fl exibility to medical professionals, researchers, data administrators and courts. Analysis of this, however, raises separate issues beyond the scope of this paper.
